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Abstract 
Economic instruments for environmental quality management have received 
widespread attention in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries as a means of 
achieving improved environmental quality at the lowest cost. This paper describes the 
economic instruments currently used in water quality management - charges, subsidies 
and effluent trading, then reviews the experience of Western countries in exercising 
these policies. The paper further identifies new institutional developments aimed at 
achieving more effective environmental quality management. Based upon this 
experience with both instruments and institutions in Western countries, lessons are 
offered for improving water quality management policy in Central and Eastern Europe. 
The State of the Art in 
Economic Instruments and Institutions 
for 
Water Quality Management 
Mark Grzfin Smith 
1. Introduction 
The United States and the western European countries control water quality using 
a variety of instruments and institutions. These tools range from regulatory command 
and control (CAC) approaches of technological, emissions and ambient standards to 
economic or incentive-based approaches such as charges, subsidies and transferable 
discharge permits (TDPs). As the economies of the CEE countries move from central 
planning to the free market, it is appropriate to review both the literature on and 
experience with economic instruments for water quality management to understand how 
they might be applied in that setting. The Central and Eastern European countries face 
serious water quality problems and the resources needed to address these problems are 
large (Somlyddy, 1993). The challenge of improving water quality in CEE requires 
finding cost-effective approaches that are appropriate to the institutional context of 
individual CEE countries. 
The purpose of water quality control is to maintain water quality at desired levels 
at the lowest possible cost (Kularathna and Somlyody, 1994). While much has been 
written by economists about the determination of the optimum or "desired level" of 
water quality (for example, Feenberg and Mills, 1980; Smith and Desvousges, 1986), the 
intangible nature of most water quality benefits has meant that, in practice, water quality 
standards have not been established on the basis of economic criteria. This 
notwithstanding, economics has made considerable contribution to the identification and 
evaluation of cost minimizing approaches for water quality management under an 
exogenously determined set of water quality objectives. This paper reviews both what 
has been proposed and what has been tried toward the aim of identifying appropriate 
water quality management policies for Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). 
2. First Principles 
Economists describe pollution as a "negative externality". Externalities arise 
when a non-market impact resulting from the consumption or production activity of one 
economic agent (a person, household, firm, state-run enterprise, etc.) affects the welfare 
of another economic agent. Untreated municipal sewage is a good example of an 
externality as its effects can include both impacts on market goods such as fish, non- 
market goods such as swimming and recreational fishing and publicly provided goods 
such as drinking water. The important distinction is that the consequence is a non- 
market or non-priced effect so that the market neither rewards or penalizes its producer. 
When economic activity generates pollution as an externality, there are a number 
of important implications for the market allocation of resources (Tietenberg, 1992): 
(1) Too much output is produced. 
(2) Too much pollution is produced. 
(3) The prices for the pollution generating product are too low. 
(4) There are no incentives to look for less polluting means of 
production. 
(5) Recycling and reuse of polluting substances are discouraged 
because release into the environment is inefficiently cheap. 
The misallocation of resources associated with pollution requires some means of 
"internalizing" the externality so that its producer faces some consequence from its 
pollution generating activity. 
Coase (1960) observed that all externalities are essentially cases in which 
property rights are undefined. Where property rights are well defined, pollution 
problems can be resolved either through the market, negotiation or litigation between 
property owners.' In absence of clear property rights government intervention is 
necessary to correct the failure of the market to efficiently allocate resources when 
externalities are generated. 
The most widespread approach used affect the control of pollution is to set 
standards based upon abatement technology, effluent levels and/or ambient 
environmental quality. These standards are then monitored and enforced using fines and 
penalties. Research has shown that this "Command and Control" (CAC) fails to achieve 
desired environmental quality improvements at minimum cost (Tietenberg, 1985). 
Economic instruments provide a means to meet the same objectives at lower cost. 
3. Economic Instruments: Efficiency and Equity Properties 
The primary argument for economic instruments is efficiency2, i.e. they achieve 
'The common law tradition of England and the United States requires that a party have 
legal "standing" to seek remedy from the courts for damage from pollution. Standing 
requires that the affected party can demonstrate loss in the value or enjoyment of their 
property. Under the common law tradition it is legally impossible for anyone to sue on 
behalf of "the environment" or "the fish" in an attempt to affect water quality 
improvements. While it is conceivable that property rights could be granted to make such 
suits feasible, it is not clear that such a litigious system would be more effective than 
regulatory and other economic approaches where uncertainty, information and transactions 
costs are high. 
2The term efficient is used here and throughout the paper in the sense of production 
efficiency, a given output is produced at the lowest cost. In this case a target level of 
pollution control is achieved at the lowest possible cost. Its use here should be 
the desired level of effluent reduction at the lowest cost. The mechanism by which this 
is achieved is the equalization of the marginal cost of abatement (MCA) across all 
pollution sources (Tietenberg, 1992). This is illustrated in Figure 1 which compares a 
standard requiring uniform emissions reduction against an effluent tax. Under the 
standard the total cost of emissions control for firms A and B is the sum of areas BDF 
and EDF. Under the tax the total cost of emissions control is the sum of areas CDE and 
IDG. Clearly the cost of control is higher under the uniform reduction standard. This 
will be true any time there is a divergence in the control cost among sources. Two 
other important differences between the standard and charge are apparent from this 
diagram. First, under the charge levels of emissions control diverge across sources. 
Second, under the charge polluters not only pay the cost of control area CDE for firm A 
and area IDG for firm B, but also a tax to the government, area HCEO for firm A and 
area HIGO for firm B. Both of these results have implications for the perceived fairness 
of a charge policy which will be discussed below. 
At a more macro level effluent charges place a price on the use of the 
environment for disposing of wastes thereby sending a signal to polluters that generating 
effluent imposes a cost on society. This signal will in turn affect production and 
consumption decisions throughout the economy resulting in the more efficient use of 
resources (von Hayek, 1945). 
Economists recognize that the concept of fairness or equity lacks a unique 
definition. Treating everyone the same, pay as-you-go, soak the rich, help the poor are 
all widely understood, but often mutually exclusive, concepts of equity. While in theory 
it is easy to couple instruments which promote efficiency with instruments that promote 
"fairness", this is harder to achieve in practice. Who will bear the cost and who will 
reap the benefit are central questions in the design of water quality management policy. 
They are ultimately the key to the political acceptability of any proposed water quality 
management program. Thus it is critical in evaluating economic instruments for water 
quality management to ask not only how they will promote efficient, but also how they 
will distribute the benefits and costs. 
4. The Instruments 
Economic approaches to environmental quality management consist of three 
primary instrument: taxes, subsidies and transferable discharge permits (TDPs). This 
section describes each of these instruments as well as briefly discussing deposit-return 
systems as an alternative for controlling diffuse toxic pollutants. 
distinguished from it's more general use in economics, allocative efficiency, which implies 
that certain conditions are met on both supply demand sides. True allocative efficiency 
cannot be achieved without knowledge of both the costs and the benefits of pollution 
abatement. 
Figure 1: Comparison of the Efficiency of an Effluent Tax Versus a Standard 
$/unit 1 Control Standard 
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0 G F E Pollution 
Taxes or charges on pollution producing activities can be imposed in a variety of 
ways - on the pollutant, on the final product or on inputs into the production process. In 
all cases the tax will have three main effects. First, the tax will increase the cost of 
polluting and therefore create an incentive to reduce emissions. The magnitude of this 
effect will depend upon the level of the tax and the responsiveness of the firm to a 
change in the cost of prod~ct ion .~  Second, the tax forces the internalization of the 
environmental costs caused by pollution and therefore makes the polluter pay for 
disposing emissions into the environment. Third, taxes raise revenue. 
A variation on taxing the pollutant alone is to use taxes to create a price 
differential between products on the basis of their contribution to pollution. Products 
that generate more pollution are taxed more heavily, products that generate less are 
taxed less, perhaps even subsidized. For example the purchase of a toilet could include 
a tax based upon the amount of water used per flush with low flow toilet eligible for a 
rebate. The objective of tax differentiation is to create an incentive for "environmentally 
friendly" behavior. 
4.2 Subsidies 
Whereas the purpose of taxes is to discourage pollution generating activities, the 
purpose of subsidies is to encourage pollution reduction. While in theory, polluters can 
be subsidized on the basis of how much emissions have been reduced, in practice it is 
politically unpopular to pay someone not to pollute. Subsidies usually come in the form 
of either grants, soft loans or tax allowances for capital expenditures undertaken to 
control pollution (Opschoor and Vos, 1989). 
4.3 Deposit-Refund Systems 
In deposit-refund systems surcharge is placed on a potentially polluting product. 
When the product or its residual is returned, and the pollution thus avoided, the 
surcharge is refunded. The most wide-spread deposit-refund schemes are intended to 
reduce solid waste disposal, litter and energy use (e.g., beverage containers in most 
western European countries, car hulks in Norway and Sweden). Water quality is at least 
an indirect concern behind recently implemented programs to reduce soil contamination 
and possibly groundwater contamination by requiring deposits on car batteries. Such 
systems might also be practical for other water pollutants emanating from highly 
dispersed sources such as household chemicals. 
4.4 Transferable Discharge Permits (TDPs) 
Under a system of transferable discharge permits firms receive permits to 
discharge emissions up to a certain limit. Firms that manage to reduce their level of 
3 Economists use the term elasticity to describe the responsiveness of supply or demand 
to a change in price. Elasticity is defined as: %AQuantity/%APrice. 
emissions below this level can sell or trade their unused permits to other firms which 
can then exceed their initial pollution limit. The aim of a TDP program is to create a 
market in "pollution rights" which will enable firms to achieve the economic efficiency 
objective of equating the marginal cost of pollution abatement across all sources thus 
minimizing the total cost of pollution control (Hahn, 1989). 
Transferable discharge permit programs in their most general form allow trading 
amongst different firms and across a region (watershed) or nation. More limited forms 
of "trading pollution" have also evolved to attempt to achieve efficient control of 
emissions at the level of the firm or a sub-region. These are offsets, bubbles, netting 
and banking. 
Offsets. The purpose of an offset policy is to allow new sources or the 
expansion of old sources in areas which have yet to achieve the targeted level of 
ambient environmental quality. New sources or the expansion of old sources is 
permitted by obtaining emission reduction credits (ERCs) from existing sources. ERCs 
are made available when existing sources have reduced their levels of emissions below 
those required by law. The primary purpose of an offset policy is to allow economic 
development in non-attainment areas rather than achieve economic efficiency in 
pollution control. Currently offsets are included as a component of air quality 
management under the U.S. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 and under the Plant 
Renewal Clause of the German Technical Guidelines for the Control of Air Quality of 
1974 (Tietenberg, 1990; Opschoor and Vos, 1989). Most of the offsets under the Clean 
Air Act Amendments have been internal transactions (Opschoor and Vos, 1989). 
Bubbles. The "bubble" draws its name from the conceptual notion of treating 
multiple sources as if they were under a bubble from which there is but a single source 
of pollution. Originally, the Clean Air Act required compliance by each individual 
source, each and every stack at a refinery, for example, had to be in compliance with 
emissions standards. Under the bubble policy what matters are total emissions from the 
bubble, rather than the emissions from individual sources. Bubbles allow the 
reallocation of emissions among existing point sources under the condition that total 
emissions do not exceed the sum of the mandated levels for individual sources. Bubbles 
thus allow firms to minimize the cost of emissions control by reallocating emissions 
reduction to the lowest cost points of control, i.e., to equate the marginal cost of control 
across sources. While the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 allow multi-plant 
bubbles, in practice most bubbles cover only a single plant (Opschoor and Vos, 1989). 
Netting. Netting allows existing firms to use emissions reduction credits (ERCs) 
earned by reducing emissions at existing sources to modify or expand other sources 
within the same plant. Netting allows firms to avoid the requirements of the new source 
review process. Its primary purpose is to provide regulatory relief rather than promote 
efficiency (Tietenberg, 1990). 
Banking. Banking allows firms to retain credit for emissions control activities 
that exceed required levels. Banking allows for the discrete or "lumpy" nature of capital 
investment in pollution control. Banked credits or ERCs can be retained to allow for 
future expansion or sold under the offset or bubble schemes described previously 
(Opschoor and Vos, 1989). 
5. Economic Instruments Evaluated: Conceptual Issues and Practical 
Experience 
The preceding section defined the basic principles of economic or incentive-based 
instruments for environmental quality management. This section presents the major 
arguments for using economic instruments in water quality management, evaluates the 
experience with their application, and attempts to define specific lessons from that 
experience. 
5.1 Effluent Charges 
The Case for Effluent Charges. The basic arguments for effluent charges were 
outlined above: they increase the cost of polluting thus creating incentives to reduce 
effluent discharge, they force the polluter to pay the cost of using the services of the 
environment to dispose of wastes; and they raise revenue. Along with these attributes, a 
effluent charge system may have a number of other attractive features (Brown and 
Johnson, 1984): 
(1) Charges create incentives for firms to look for ways to reduce pollution. This 
may involve input substitution, changes in production processes and changes in 
the character of their output as well as effluent treatment processes. For example 
the German chemical firm, BASF, introduced a system of internal liability for 
effluent within different branches of the firm in response to effluent charges 
imposed by the federal government. This system resulted in a 20 percent 
reduction in effluent discharge (Brown and Johnson, 1984). 
(2) Charges increase incentives for municipalities to rationalize sewage pricing policy 
by establishing waste-load based charges on firms which discharge into the 
municipal sewage treatment system. Faced with effluent charges, municipalities 
will seek means to pass back these costs to indirect dischargers thus creating the 
same incentives for direct dischargers outlined above. 
(3) Charges stimulate municipalities to improve effluent monitoring. While the 
incentive to keep better track of effluent follows from a self-interested motivation 
to reduce cost, a secondary public benefit results from the generation of more 
complete and precise data with which to manage water quality. Such is the case 
in Germany (Brown and Johnson, 1984). 
( 5 )  Charges make revenues available for financing water quality improvements. To 
the extent that these funds are made available to dischargers for pollution control 
and investment in pollution reducing industrial processes, it will mitigate the 
unpopularity of a charge scheme. 
(6) Charges shift the burden of financing the water quality management program 
from the taxpayer to the polluter. This may not only make water quality 
management more attractive to the public, it may also make it more attractive to 
CEE governments seeking to fulfill a variety of obligations with limited 
resources. 
(7)  Charges make more revenues available for water quality management and 
therefore monitoring and enforcement. As a consequence a higher level of 
compliance may be achieved. However, financing enforcement through effluent 
charges may generate excessive enthusiasm for enforcing compliance. This may 
require some mechanism to prevent abuse. 
Experience. The following briefly summarizes the most notable examples of the 
use of effluent charges in water quality management. No attempt has been made to 
provide a complete description of these programs, but to offer sufficient background as 
to glean the key lessons from their experience. Brown and Johnson (1984) review the 
German program, Anderson (1 99 1) the Dutch as well as the Danish programs and 
Opschoor and Vos (1989) assess the German, French, Italian and Dutch charge systems. 
Table 1 highlights the salient features of the French, German and Dutch effluent 
charge programs. There are notable similarities and some significant differences. Most 
notably, all combine effluent charges with the use of standards; none rely on effluent 
charges alone to provide sufficient incentive to achieved the desired water quality 
objectives. Revenues generated are used in all to both fund the administration of the 
program and finance public and private investments in pollution abatement. Except in 
the case of large plants in Holland and France, charges are based upon average or 
expected loads rather than actual loads. Household charges are based on a flat rate in 
the two countries in which they are applied, France and Holland. Charges vary by 
region in both France and Holland reflecting differences in regional pollution control 
construction programs rather than differences in assimilative capacity. 
Each program also has distinctive features. The distinguishing feature of the 
German program is the schedule of charge reductions associated with the degree of 
compliance. No charge reduction is earned for simply meeting the minimum standard, 
however firms which reduce discharges beyond this standard can receive charge 
reductions up to 100%. 
A striking feature of the Dutch system is that charges can apply to the water 
boards themselves when discharging into the waters of the state, i.e. large rivers, 
channels and reservoirs. The state may impose charges upon a water board if the waters 
under the board's authority are of unacceptable quality. An adjacent water board 
receiving unacceptable water may also request that the offending water board is charged. 
The French program points to both strengths and weaknesses of self-financing 
local or regional authorities. On the one hand the direct recycling of charges back into 
pollution abatement efforts has lessened industry's opposition to water quality 
management. On the other it is recognized that, at some point, industry may effectively 
block higher water quality standards by refusing to pay higher charges. 
- Organic/Ammonia Nitrogen 
- Total Phosphorus 




luent Charge Programs 
Holland 
France - Suspended Matter 
- Oxidizable Matter 
- Soluble Salts 
- Inhibitory Matter 
Administration 
- Six river basin authorities which are 
financially independent 
- Charges levied on firms and households 
- Revenues raised fund administration and 
public and private abatement activities 
- Charges not related to abatement costs 
- Charges vary by authority 
- Combined standardcharge system 
- Settling Substances 
- Oxidizing Substances 
- Mercury 
- Cadmium 
- Toxicity to Fish 
Notes 
- Revenues recycled directly back for 
abatement activities. 
- Low incentive effect due to low charge 
rates 
- Overall impact on improving water 
quality unclear 
- Biodegradable Matter 
- Suspendable Solids 
- Toxic Substances 
- Heavy Metals 
- State (Lander) based 
- Charges levied on direct dischargers 
only 
- Revenues fund administration and 
public and private abatement activates 
- Administration costs are high 
- Charges set by federal government 
- Combined standardcharge system 
- Administered jointly by the national 
government and 140 local water boards 
- variable rates based on loads 
- Charge levied on firms and households 
- Administration costs low 
- Charges set by water boards 
- Charges apply to local water boards as 
well as households and firms 
- Combined standardcharge system 
- Charges based on compliance levels 
with discounts for exceeding standards 
- Exemptions possible for hardship 
- Notable improvement in water quality 
- Has possibly promoted technological 
innovation 
- Primary intent is financial, but appears 
to have incentive effect as well 
- 80% decrease in pollutant load 
- Aggressive water quality program has 
not impeded industrial growth 
- Program may have promoted over 
expansion of treatment capacity 
Sources: Anderson (1991), Brown and Johnson (1984), Opshoor and Vos (1989). 
Work by Pethig (1989) is especially relevant given the models of the French and 
German effluent charge systems whose principal purpose is to finance the activities of 
the water authority. Pethig shows under a general set of theoretical conditions that 
water quality management will be inefficient when firms using publicly provided 
wastewater treatment only pay for the costs needed to finance the system. Industrial 
wastewater abatement activity will be too low and the public treatment facility will 
operate at an inefficiently high level. Efficiency requires that firms are charged not only 
for the cost of treatment but also for the "free service" provided by the assimilative 
capacity of the receiving water body. All existing charge programs implicitly recognize 
this fact by imposing standards in conjunction with charges. 
Lessons. The effluent charge systems now in use bear little resemblance to an 
optimal system of charges reflecting the strength, content, location and timing of the 
discharge as well as the flow, temperature and water quality goals for the receiving 
water body. Moreover, charges are set too low to induce the necessary level of control 
to achieve the desired level of water quality alone. Nevertheless, experience has shown 
that they effectively raise revenue for water quality management and have generated 
some incentive for pollution abatement and innovation in control technology. Their 
political acceptability can be promoted by recycling revenues back into investments in 
abatement projects which clearly demonstrate water quality improvements. 
5.2 Subsidies 
If the purpose of effluent taxes is to raise revenues and discourage pollution 
generating activities, the purpose of subsidies is to promote environmentally desirable 
behavior. However environmentally desirable water pollution control might be, the 
public opposes subsidies to polluters for two reasons - first, they cost money. Second, 
paying someone to stop doing something bad seems at best unfair, at worst immoral. 
Furthermore, granting a subsidy for pollution abatement violates the widely-held 
environmental quality management objective, the polluter-pays-principle (Opschoor and 
Vos, 1989). 
Subsidies are largely borne of political expediency. Both industry and 
municipalities argue that they need help to meet new requirements created by 
environmental legislation, i.e. to make the transition from a lower to a higher level of 
abatement activity. Many governments accept this position and have instituted subsidy 
programs for capital investment in pollution control but not the cost of operating the 
plant once built (Opschoor and Vos, 1989). 
It is also recognized that certain dischargers will have difficulty complying with 
environmental standards. Where uniform standards or charges are applied, subsidies are 
a means of redistributing the costs and facilitating compliance. Evidence from the U.S. 
experience suggests that the true hardship cases are small in number and that the 
regulatory "stick" has been more important that the subsidy "carrot" in achieving 
compliance with the Clean Water Act (Freeman, 1990). 
Subsidies have been critical in buying political acceptance for water quality 
management. Industry is more willing to agree to controlling pollution if the cost of 
control is subsidized. Opschoor and Vos (1989) conclude in their survey of the use of 
economic instruments in the OECD countries that subsidies have contributed little to 
enhancing environmental quality, they may have been necessary for establishing 
environmental programs in the first place. 
Subsidies may hasten investment in pollution control for two reasons. One, 
because they lower the cost of compliance and two, those eligible for the subsidy may 
adopt a "get it while you can" attitude if it is uncertain how much money will be 
available or how long the program will last. Again, limited empirical evidence from 
both the United States (Freeman, 1990) and Germany (Opschoor and Vos, 1989) 
suggests compliance deadlines are more important than subsidies in achieving rapid 
compliance. 
Subsidies may be the only means of achieving pollution reduction from those 
who are not required to do so. In North Carolina agricultural best management practices 
(BMPs) to reduce nutrient loadings are voluntary. However, reducing nonpoint source 
loadings may be more cost effective than tertiary treatment. Municipalities in the Tar- 
Pamlico watershed in North Carolina have joined together in a river basin association to 
fund a cost sharing program for agricultural BMPs (Swanek, 1994). Since they have no 
regulatory means to impose BMPs on farmers the cities must buy their cooperation with 
the program. 
Subsidies appear to have achieved little improvement in environmental quality 
that would not have been achieved by strict enforcement of water quality standards. 
Subsidies have also contributed to the general level of uncertainty in water quality 
management. In the U.S. the federal government's cost sharing contribution has varied 
from 30 to 85 to 55 percent. Congress has in turn funded different levels of support 
than were initially requested. The subsidy program may have in fact delayed some 
investment in pollution abatement at a time when municipalities expected the EPA's cost 
sharing component to rise (Freeman, 1990). 
The most frequently cited criticism of the U.S. construction grants program for 
municipal water treatment is that it has led to excessive capital investment in sewage 
treatment. Treatment plant are built with excessive capacity and a bias toward 
expensive capital intensive processes and away from equally effective, but lower capital 
cost methods of treatment such as sewage lagoons (U. S. Congress, 1985). 
While subsidy programs may be necessary in the short-run to gain political 
support for water quality management and address the needs of true hardship cases, once 
established they are hard to end. All subsidy programs breed dependency by narrow 
interests and help finance the growth of their political clout which in turn is used to 
push for the continuance of the program. Revenues that could be more effectively spent 
to address new problems are tied to problems or approaches that no longer require 
support. Opschoor and Vos (1989) report that France and Germany have begun to shift 
the emphasis of their spending programs away from effluent treatment to 
implementation of new, cleaner process technologies, a promising sign. 
5.3 Effluent Trading 
The primary argument for effluent trading systems is cost minimization. 
Allowing dischargers to trade permits among themselves will, under competitive market 
conditions, achieve the cost minimizing condition that the marginal cost of pollution 
control is equated across all firms. In addition to this argument TDPs potentially have a 
number of other attractive qualities: 
(1) Effluent trading systems are, in theory, administratively simple. Once permits 
have been distributed, interaction occurs among dischargers rather than between 
individual dischargers and the government. The water authority continues to 
monitor and enforce water quality standards, but the permit system obviates the 
need to administer compliance with technological standards for specific 
dischargers or the system of effluent charges. 
(2) TDPs allow for flexibility. Some firms will choose to significantly reduce their 
effluent discharge and sell permits, others will choose to increase it and buy 
them. A TDP market allows for the separation of who pays for pollution control 
from who installs it thus creating greater flexibility in meeting water quality 
standards. 
(3) TDPs allow for the development of leasing markets wherein firms may acquired 
permits to meet short-run needs. This feature is particularly attractive in 
transition periods in which a firm would be better off to lease permits than to 
invest in new pollution control equipment to be used with outdated process 
technology. Leased TDPs allow firms the flexibility to forestall investment in 
pollution control until this investment can be coordinated with new investment in 
the production process itself, potentially at a lower cost than end-of-the-pipe 
measures (Tietenburg, 1990). 
(4) The initial allocation can be used to achieve distributional objectives at no 
expense to cost effectiveness. TDPs can be auctioned off, given away, given to 
some and sold to others. From a cost efficiency perspective the method of initial 
distribution is irrelevant (Coase, 1960). The efficiency of the system is not 
driven by the initial distribution of the permits but by the trading activity that 
occurs among dischargers which drives marginal abatement costs to equality. 
The method of initial distribution is not, however, inconsequential to polluters 
(Eheart et al., 1980). TDPs have value which is either retained by the firm if 
they are given away or transferred to the government if they are sold. The fact 
that the government creates this value by establishing a market for TDPs allows 
them the additional policy flexibility to differentially favor municipalities over 
industry, one industry over another, growing versus decaying sectors, etc.. 
( 5 )  Correctly administered, TDPs create a secure property right, that is an entitlement 
to discharge a certain amount of pollutant over a specified period of time. In 
doing so, they reduce the uncertainty associated with standards and charges both 
of which can be changed at any time. If under a TDP system the government 
decides to achieve higher water quality standards it must purchase and retire a 
share of the outstanding permits. The reduction in regulatory uncertainty 
engendered by a TDP systems allows polluters to make more rational long term 
decisions about pollution control. 
(6) TDPs eliminate the need to continuously revise the water quality management 
program in response to economic growth. Under a static program of either 
effluent charges or standards, the level of water quality will be negatively related 
to growth in population and economic activity. A stable level of water quality 
can be achieved only by increasing the stringency of the standard or the amount 
of the charge. Such changes raise the level of regulatory uncertainty against 
which dischargers must make long-term capital investments in pollution control. 
Because the ultimate level of water quality is established by the number of 
permits initially allocated there is no need to administratively adjust the system in 
response to increased economic activity. Reallocation of permits will occur 
within the TDP market to accommodate new economic activity. The price of 
permits will increase with demand, however this price will equal the opportunity 
cost of pollution control rather than the government's attempt to estimate that 
value with new charges or standards. 
(7) TDPs cost the polluter less than effluent charges. This issue was previously 
discussed above as an equity concern. It may be a greater concern in CEE 
countries where there is a pressing need for capital investment in production 
technology as well as pollution control. TDPs allow firms to retain more 
resources which can be invested in either pollution control or process technology. 
Experience. The experience with transferable discharge permits systems is very 
limited. The only example of a true permit trading system for water quality 
management exists on Wisconsin's Fox River in the United States. The other programs 
might more appropriately be called "offset" schemes since they facilitate offsets between 
different sources; they do not, however, involve an initial distribution and subsequent 
trades in permits. 
Table 2 outlines the principal features of the existing programs. One other 
program in Colorado at Cherry Creek Reservoir is not included because of its similarity 
to the program at Dillon Reservoir. The SO, program has also been included to 
highlight some of the differences between air and water quality management. 
The table reveals a number of interesting aspects of emissions trading in practice 
versus optimistic theoretical results. While there has been speculation in the literature 
about optimal means of controlling multiple pollutants (Lence et al., 1988; Lence, 1991), 
existing programs target only one pollutant. While the Tar-Pamlico program includes 
both phosphorus and nitrogen, that program does not involve permit trading. In all 
cases the target pollutant is the water quality limiting parameter for that particular water 
body. 
The second observation is that trades are almost non-existent. It has been more 
than a decade since the Fox River and Dillon reservoir programs began. Both have seen 
Table 2. Comparison of Effluent Trading Programs 
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one trade. If the efficiency of TDP programs results from the reallocation of abatement 
activity that tradeable permits allow, how can the program effect any cost savings if no 
trades occur. Novotny (1986) assesses the Fox River program and concludes that there 
are six reasons why more trading has not occurred: (1) the program as implemented 
exacerbates rather than elevates transactions cost for both traders and the State; (2) the 
market is thin, so the transactions cost for traders trying to find each other is high; (3) 
trades cannot be made solely to reduce costs (emphasis added); (4) trades must be made 
for a least one year, but not more than five years (the life of the permit). It is not clear 
to anyone if the State will allow those who have accumulated permits to extend them 
after five years, therefore increasing uncertainty about the value of the permit in the 
long-run. (5) The program was established on top of existing standards and dischargers 
were still required to comply with these standards thus reducing the scope of trading 
activity. Finally, (6) water quality control costs are less than one percent of product cost 
for industries involved thus providing little incentive to trade. 
John Palmisano, the architect of the SO, trading program has observed that the 
number of trades is not necessarily the best indicator of the cost effectiveness of a 
trading program (Barr, 1991). Trading may create opportunities within a firm to control 
effluent at a lower cost simply because the burden of regulatory compliance is less 
within the new system than in the old. The new policy allows them to exploit new 
ways of reducing discharges without regulatory review. This may be true for both the 
Dillon and Tar-Pamlico cases, where activities have been undertaken to offset discharges 
that have not resulted in actual "trades". 
The third observation is that all programs involve relatively homogenous sets of 
dischargers. This may limit trading activity where there is little opportunity to exploit 
differences in abatement cost functions. Nevertheless, it makes it easier to identify 
uniform trading rules and administrative procedures which lower the transactions costs 
of trading. 
Finally, it should be noted that even the much celebrated SO, trading program, as 
practiced, does not successful resolve the problem of the spatial variation of sources. 
While the EPA has retained the right to approve trades it has permitted trades that, while 
maintaining the overall level of SO, emissions, result in a reduction in air quality over 
the region it was largely designed to protect - New England and the mid-Atlantic States. 
Lessons. A well functioning TDP market requires the control authority to be 
able to define for each pollutant and each emitter a vector of transfer coefficients which 
links emissions at location X with concentrations at each pre-defined receptor location. 
Under this condition specific trades can be identified (Tietenberg, 1993). The TDP 
market must also be competitive. Examining these conditions reveals the potential 
shortcomings of TDP systems for water quality management. 
In most water quality management problems, in contrast to numerous important 
air quality management problems (Klaassen, 1994), the pollutant is not well mixed. 
Spatial variability of the pollutant characterizes the system. Different emitters have 
differential impacts on distinct receptors. This fact makes it impossible to make trades 
on the basis of a uniform trading ratio amongst all emitters as each emitter's impact on 
the receptors is different. 
There are three reasons why this is problematic. First, it makes trades 
complicated. Parties wishing to engage in a trade have no straightforward way to 
estimate whether or not their trade will comply with ambient water quality standards. 
The complexity of trades serves as a barrier to trading activity. Second, because trades 
are complicated and both emitters and the control authority are concerned that trades 
comply with the standards, the authority must approve each trade (Novotny, 1986). 
Third, the non-uniformity of emitters impacts on receptors necessitates grouping emitters 
into submarkets in which their impacts are similar. This reduces the number of players 
in the market thereby increasing the likelihood that there will be too few actors and too 
few trades to insure a competitive market. 
There are additional issues. If permits are initially distributed free of charge to 
all existing dischargers, these existing sources are favored at the expense of new 
sources. If these new sources are firms they will incur the additional expense of 
acquiring TDPs in the market from other sources (potentially competitors) that initially 
received their permits for free. At one level it is simply unfair, at another it may 
discourage investment in new production capacity which has lower operating costs 
except for the cost of the permits. This problem will be exacerbated to the extent that 
existing firms have market power. In theory the control authority could withhold 
permits in the initial allocation to make available to new sources in the future, in 
practice all existing sources are grandfathered into the system, permits are distributed 
gratis and none are withheld from the initial distribution (Tietenberg, 1990). 
Finally, firms may be unwilling to participate in the TDP market for a variety of 
reasons. Selling permits may foreclose future options. If the asset value of the TDPs is 
not large the firm may prefer to retain the flexibility of using its permits later. A 
municipality may not wish to limit the potential for future growth or face the uncertainty 
of trying to buy the necessary future permits. Unused TDPs not only represent the right 
to pollute, but the option to pollute more in the future. Where the current value of the 
permit is low, dischargers may prefer to hold them. 
6.  Cross Cutting Themes in Incentive-Based Approaches to Water Quality 
Management 
Not all economic analysis of water quality management has focused on the 
efficacy of alternative instruments. Other important studies have examined enforcement, 
the political economy of environmental quality management, capital turnover and the 
spatial variability problem. This literature is reviewed here. 
Magat and Viscusi (1990) performed an empirical study on the regulation of the 
pulp and paper industry in the U.S. under the Clean Water Act. Their objective was to 
analyze the relationship between inspections and compliance. They conclude that 
enforcement of water quality standards in the pulp and paper industry are an "unusual 
success story." They identify the basis of this success as the coupling of feasible 
standards with strinzent enforcement (emphasis added) where enforcement is measured 
as the frequency of inspections. In addition they found that increasing inspections 
reduced non-reporting of pollutant discharge levels. Their conclusions different from 
their own previous work on health in safety regulations in which stringent standards are 
coupled with weak enforcement. That policy does not work. 
Enforcement is similarly the focus of Russell's (1990) study of monitoring and 
enforcement of pollution control laws in Europe. Russell surveys monitoring and 
enforcement practices in six countries (Belgium, France, German, Italy, Spain and the 
United Kingdom) and concludes that: 
A general characteristic of the European monitoring and enforcement 
systems might fairly be drawn as follows: Infrequent, often pre-arranged, 
visits are made to measure discharges. Defining what constitutes a 
violation is likely to some large extent to be within the discretion of the 
inspector who makes the visit. When a violation is discovered, the 
penalty for it is likely to be fairly small, at least when measured against 
aggregate corporate profits. 
Russell notes that both the probability of inspection and the maximum fine limit are an 
order of magnitude greater in Germany than in the other countries surveyed but does not 
present any evidence as to whether this achieves greater compliance. In concluding, he 
suggests that economists might do well to focus more attention on the problem of 
motivating compliance rather than attending only to the problem of policy design under 
the erroneous assumption of perfect compliance. 
In an analysis of the distributional impacts of alternative pollution control 
measures Dewees (1990) asserts that economists have failed to understand the political 
effects of economic instruments because their work has focused on either the efficiency 
of alternative instruments or the diJiuuse distributional impacts on the general public, 
taxpayers, regions, product consumers, etc. (emphasis added). Dewees' analysis focuses 
upon the impacts of charge and effluent programs on capital (shareholders) and labor 
(employees,) those interests on which there are large impacts on a small number of 
people. He finds that shareholders and employees are more negatively impacted by 
either of the two economic instruments than by standards, and that in fact they may 
prefer standards to no regulation at all if they are tougher on new firms, thus creating 
barriers to entry for new competitors. He concludes that charge and effluent trading 
policies can be made political acceptable to capital and labor if they are compensated for 
their losses. 
In a study with potentially significant implications for transitional economies 
Maloney and Brady (1988) analyze the impact of environmental quality regulation on 
capital turnover in the electric power industry. At issue is the policy under the U.S. 
Clean Air Act requiring new sources to meet more stringent standards than existing 
sources. They find that this policy creates significant incentives to continue operation of 
(dirty) existing plants with a concomitant decrease in environmental quality. Ironically 
those states with the most stringent new source performance standards had SO, 
emissions rates which were 27% higher as a result of delayed investment in new plant 
and equipment induced by the tougher standards. Their work suggests that policies 
which differentiate between new and old sources by requiring new sources to meet 
tougher standards will delay desired environmental quality improvements. 
One of the most significant problems of applying either charges or TDPs for 
water quality management is separating out the impacts of dischargers on receptors. 
The problem of applying economic instruments in water quality management can be 
greatly simplified if the impacts of different dischargers do not overlap receptors, or 
dischargers can be grouped according to their impacts on specific receptors. Eheart 
(1990) and Eheart et al. (1990) provide two useful techniques for addressing these 
problems. Eheart (1 990) describes a simplified technique for identifLing when the 
impacts of nonconservative pollutants from one discharger can be considered 
independently of other dischargers. Eheart et al. (1990) present a method for defining 
groups of dischargers whose impact on water quality is relatively homogenous. While 
previous studies have used groupings of dischargers to examine the impacts of group 
differentiated charge or permit trading schemes (Brill et al., 1984; Kshirsagar and 
Eheart, 1982), these studies identified groupings on an ad hoc basis. Where grouping is 
possible the task of administrating either permit trading or differentiated effluent charges 
will be greatly simplified. 
7. The Evolving Institutional Context 
Instruments are but one part of water quality management. Just as the experience 
of the last two decades has demonstrated shortcomings in policy tools, so has this 
experience shown that the institutions that develop and use these tools fall short of their 
mission. Environmental policy has been criticized as being arbitrary, centralized, 
narrowly focused and sometimes ineffectual. In response to these criticisms the 
institutions are evolving to meet the challenge of more effectively managing 
environmental quality. 
In what follows, several of the most recent trends in U.S. environmental policy 
are briefly described. They are negotiated rule making, ecosystem or watershed 
approaches to water quality management, decentralization and national expert programs. 
The bias towards the American experience comes with the apologies of the author. 
Negotiated Rule Making. Negotiated rule making has evolved as a response to 
the criticism that environmental regulations are too arbitrary and the process in which 
regulations are developed is too adversarial. Ordinarily, environmental legislation as 
enacted by Congress sets only very broad environmental objectives, such as the 
"fishable, swimmable" standard of the Clean Water Act. It is the responsibility of the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to promulgate specific regulations through 
which these objectives will be achieved. In doing this, the EPA develops draft 
regulations, publishes them for public comment then incorporates these comments as it 
sees fit into its final regulations. Public participation in this process, whether from 
industry, environmental groups or state enforcement agencies, comes as criticism of the 
draft regulations. The alternatives open to anyone who is unhappy with the regulation 
are to either apply political pressure or find grounds to sue EPA over the proposed 
In negotiated rule making the EPA agrees to involve representatives of all 
interested parties in the process of drafting regulations from the start. The development 
of regulations on discharges from pulp mills, for example, might involve representatives 
of the pulp and paper industry, environmental groups, state enforcement agencies as well 
as the EPA. The motivation is that the regulations developed out of this participatory 
process will meet industry's desire for cost effectiveness, the environmentalists' desire 
for improved environmental quality and the enforcing agencies desire for administrative 
efficiency. Successful examples of negotiated rule making include drafting regulations 
on underground injection, asbestos in schools and pesticide standards (EPA, 1992). 
Potential pitfalls of the process include the absence of goodwill on the part of the 
participants and the fact that the remedies of political pressure and litigation are still 
open to everyone if the process breaks down. 
Policy dialogues are a similar participatory process used to establish consensus 
on broader policy issues such as reauthorization of Superfund and use of plant genetic 
resources. 
Ecosystem or Watershed Approaches. From a systems analysis perspective 
ecosystem or watershed approaches are not new, they are simply untried. The 
fundamental idea is to evaluate each ecosystem or watershed individually, establish 
water quality objectives for the watershed, then manage for the water quality limiting 
parameters rather than a set of pre-established criteria. For example, the State of 
Colorado has a stringent water quality standard for silver. Cities in Colorado are 
currently developing programs to control silver pollution mainly generated by home and 
commercial photo processing. However, there is no evidence which shows that silver is 
a water quality limiting pollutant any where in the State except for high mountain 
streams contaminated by mine drainage. Sediment loads create a more significant 
problem but there are no sediment standards. An ecosystem approach would address the 
sediment problem first before engaging in an expensive program to reduce silver 
concentrations. Variants of this idea have been articulated in Somly6dy (1993) and 
Water Environment Federation (1 992). 
Decentralization. Over the past ten years the EPA has attempted to delegate 
more responsibility to the state and local level. While responsibility for implementing 
the EPA's programs has always been with the State's, there have been greater efforts to 
assign greater financial and decision-making authority to them as well. The Reagan 
Administration crafted this policy of "New Federalism" for three reasons. First, the 
Administration's political philosophy was that the federal government was too big and 
that programs that could be run at the state level should be. Second, the Administration 
sought to reduce the financial burden on an over-extended federal treasury by charging 
the states with more fiscal authority and responsibility. Third, the policy was consistent 
with grassroots sentiment that the federal government was out-of-touch with the people. 
While the original rational for the policy was largely philosophical and financial, 
the devolution of authority to the state and local level coincides with the current trends 
towards negotiated rule making and ecosystem management. Both negotiated rule 
making and ecosystem management include involving the affected parties in the process 
of program design and taking local concerns into account. Although much of this may 
be positive, it is worth remembering that the federal government became involved in 
environmental protection because of a combination of, lack of will at the state and local 
level, lack of technical expertise and fear that some states might use low environmental 
standards to attract investment and promote economic development. To the extent that 
these factors are relevant in the CEE countries we would do well to closely consider the 
balance between local and national control. 
National Expert Programs. The EPA has historically organized itself and 
addressed problems on the basis of media specific programs. There are branches for 
water, air, hazardous waste, etc.. Essentially these branches carry out the programs 
mandated by the various major environmental laws, the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air 
Act, Superfund which are, in general, media specific laws. While this organizational 
structure is for the most part logical, it has created two problems. First, reducing 
pollution in one media has at times increased pollution in another, i.e. an air pollution 
problem is transformed into a water pollution problem. Second, firms generating 
multiple pollutants find themselves dealing with not one, but many different offices at 
EPA. This makes the task of complying with environmental regulations more difficult, 
costly and frustrating. 
In response to these problems the EPA has recently created a small number of 
"National Expert" programs organized by industry. Two examples are programs in 
mining waste and pulp and paper. The intent of these programs is to create a single 
office within EPA with which the industry has to deal to both reduce their regulatory 
burden and to achieve a coordinated approach to emissions reduction across media. 
At this point these programs are new and have yet to establish a record to 
evaluate the efficacy of this approach. One problem noted by the director of the mining 
waste program is that these programs have been established on top of existing programs 
thereby creating conflicts amongst offices within EPA over jurisdiction and resources. 
8. Conclusions and Research Implications 
The European Economics Community (EEC) Task Force Report on the 
Environment and the Internal Market (EEC, Economic Verlag, 1990) recommends five 
basic principles for environmental policy in the Single Market (as cited in Howe, 1993): 
(1)  the prevention principle; 
(2) the polluter pays principle; 
(3) the "subsidiarity" principle, i.e. placing program responsibilities at 
the lowest (most local) level consistent with effective overall 
system performance. 
(4) the economic efficiencylcost effectiveness principle; 
(5) "legal efficiency", i.e. enforceability. 
These principles are no less relevant for the CEE, thus providing criteria against which 
to judge the applicability of economic instruments in CEE countries. 
It is clear from the literature that economic or incentive-based instruments are 
conceptually consistent with all five criteria and potentially the most effective means of 
achieving (2), making the polluter pay and (4), economic efficiency. It is also clear that: 
(a) few of the existing programs using economic instruments were designed to achieve 
an incentive effect on polluter behavior; (b) there are no pure incentive based program 
for water quality management; and (c) the limited experience with economic instruments 
has produced little convincing evidence of significant cost savings. Does this imply that 
economic instruments should be abandoned altogether? No, not yet. First, while 
economic instruments may have failed to live up to their promise, there is substantial 
evidence that standard based approaches have been excessively expensive (Tietenburg, 
1985). Second, twenty years experience with water quality management has generated 
important lessons with which more effective approaches can be designed. The task is to 
use this experience to identify the most effective mix of strategies to meet water quality 
objectives at minimum cost. This survey suggests the following lessons: 
Lesson 1: Make it simple. The successful German effluent charge program 
began by controlling only five pollutants, a strictly limited set of threshold values and an 
uncomplicated rate structure. Modifications of the law to increase the number of 
pollutants (to 10) and revise the charge system came after more than 10 years of 
operational experience. The program is administratively simple for both regulators and 
the regulated. 
Effluent trading programs for water quality appear to be moving in the same 
direction. The complexity of trades involving different impact coefficients was one of 
the impediments to trading in the Fox River case. The Dillon and Cherry Creek 
Reservoir programs are based upon trades between point and non-point sources at a 
fixed ratio. While situations in which trades at a fixed ratio are consistent with the 
dynamics of the receiving water body may be limited, it may be worthwhile to identify 
where such opportunities exist. Hughes (1991) identifies saline water emissions from 
coal mines in both Poland and the Czech Republic as one such opportunity. 
What the "make it simple" edict suggests for research is that we focus our efforts 
on identifying the best simple program rather than the program that is simply the best. 
Lesson Two: Clean Water Costs Money. Even a cost minimizing approach to 
improving water quality in the CEE will require substantial capital expenditures. France 
and Germany generate these funds with effluent charges. In the United States funding 
comes in part from the federal treasury, in part from combined water and sewerage 
charges and in part from the authority of municipalities to issue tax-exempt bonds. The 
design of a successful water quality management program for CEE countries requires 
that we ask, at the outset, from where will the money come? 
The priority for economic development and the existing debt burden in CEE 
countries make it unlikely that their governments will be willing to commit substantial 
resources to improving water quality. The money must come from either effluent 
charges or the capacity for the water quality management program to attract capital from 
the public or the private sectors. 
Effluent charges have already been discussed. Other than charges, what is 
needed to attract capital investment in water quality improvement? The answer is the 
creation of municipal or regional water quality authorities with the power to issue debt 
and guarantee repayment (Smith, 1984). This may not be as unrealistic as it might 
sound. Water and sewerage service are provided by monopolies to captive markets. 
Water and sewerage users are highly insensitive to price changes therefore increased 
prices will result in higher revenues rather than a decline in demand. Thus it is highly 
likely that investments in water quality improvements financed by charges on water and 
sewerage customers can and will be paid back. Evidence of the potential for attracting 
investment in sewage treatment is witnessed by the substantial interest by American 
investors in financing wastewater treatment in Mexico after the NAFTA agreement. 
The research task is to work with national and regional environmental authorities 
as well as municipalities to identify financing schemes that are consistent with the 
existing institutional structure and impediments to the flow of capital into water quality 
improvements. 
Lesson Three: The solution will not be pure. The German, French and Dutch 
effluent charge systems are used in conjunction with standards. The American TDP 
programs have not replaced previous standards but rather have been applied on top of 
them. All countries have means for enforcing noncompliance by issuing fines, revoking 
permits or both. While a sufficiently large charge will, in theory, induce polluters to 
reduce discharges to the desired level, no one has yet applied a charge that is large 
enough to obtain this result. TDPs cannot be applied without an enforcement 
mechanism otherwise there will be no incentive to acquire the necessary permits. 
Nor can we assume away the existing institutional framework in the CEE 
countries. Whether effective or not standards exist, monitoring and enforcement 
programs are already in place. While it is possible that some countries will be willing 
accept revolutionary change in water quality management, it is more likely that most 
countries will retain significant elements of their existing programs. 
The research task is then to identify the incremental steps from the existing 
institutional framework in each country that will result in more cost effective pollution 
control. 
Lesson Four: We're not smarter than they are. It is the presumption of the 
traditional rule making process in the United States that neither those who will benefit 
from a proposed regulation nor those who will be harmed by it have much to contribute 
to the process of developing the regulation itself. The German success with 
implementing their effluent charge program contradicts this view. In contrast to the 
implementation of the Clean Water Act in the United States where much interpretation, 
litigation and political maneuvering occurred after specific regulations had been 
promulgated, implementation of the German law was easier because effected parties had 
been involved in the development of the policy from the start (Brown and Johnson, 
1984). The analysis of Magat and Viscusi (1990) of standard setting in the pulp and 
paper industry also supports the use of broad-based participation in policy design. 
CEE governments can learn from both the German experience and the emerging 
trend toward negotiated rule making in the United States. The result will be a water 
quality policy that is more likely to be political acceptable to administer, economically 
feasible for industry and consistent with the aspirations of the people for improved water 
quality. 
The research implication is that we must work with both those who will be 
affected by water quality management policy and those who will administer the policy 
to understand the current institutional framework, understand the objectives of water 
quality management as thev see them, identify the feasible policy options and provide 
the necessary technical support to help them evaluate alternative policy options. 
Lesson Five. There's something out there bigger than us. The transition of 
the CEE countries towards market economies has unleashed economic forces that extend 
far beyond individual sectors, regions or markets. Relative prices are changing and have 
yet to achieve a stable equilibrium. These changes in relative prices will affect both the 
ways in which goods are produced and consumers' choice of goods themselves. These 
effects will in turn have an impact on water quality. Such impacts have already been 
observed where water quality has increased as a result of the decrease in aggregate 
output in the CEE countries over the last several years. 
If market economics fulfills its promise in the CEE countries and per capita GNP 
rises, what is the implication for water quality? Two forces will be at work. Higher 
incomes generate higher levels of consumption and their associated residuals. Higher 
incomes also generate greater demand for environmental quality and the ability to pay 
for it. 
The fundamental and often hard lesson of economics is - there is no free lunch. 
While relative prices are still in flux it would seem an propitious time to end the free 
lunch at the expense of water quality. By placing a price on water pollution now, CEE 
governments have the opportunity to send a powerful signal into the market - that the 
services of the nation's rivers and lakes are not free, that pollution imposes a cost on 
society, a cost that must be accounted for. In doing so at this time, before substantial 
new investment has been made in restructuring the productive base of the economy, 
firms will make different decisions about industrial processes, the use of inputs and the 
composition of outputs. They will be forced to take the cost of pollution into account. 
The result will be a productive base that is fundamentally less polluting. Because the 
capital investment that is made now will last thirty to fifty years, it is the single most 
effective action that can be taken. 
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